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INTRODUCTION
Thailand has been a rice exporter since 1855 when the Bow-ring
Treaty with Crest Britain opened Thailand up to international trade
on a significant scale. (2, p. 128). By the early 1930$s, Thailand
was exporting one-half of its annual production. Although World
War II greatly disrupted rice production and trade in the region in
general, by 1949 Thai rice exports had come back up to 1.2 million
metric tons of milled rice, or 27 percent of annual production.
Exports reached a peak in 1965, when 1.9 million tons, or 30 percent
of total production, were exported. (2, p. 129). Exports since then
have declined to about 1 million tons per year, or 10 to 12 percent
of production. Although rice exports accounted for 35 percent of
total export earnings in the early 1960’s, the proportion declined
to 20 percent in 1969. One part of the decline is due to population
increase of 3.2 percent per year, with per capita consumption of
roughly 155 kg per year of milled rice. (4, p. 108-110).
Although rice dominates agricultural production in Thailand, the
proportion of rice in planted area of all crops declined from 88 per-
cent in 1950 to 65 percent in 1967. Area planted to rice increased
durin~ those 17 years from 5,540,000 to 6,410,000 hectares, but
“:’Visiting Professor and Lecturer, respectively, Department of
~~griculturalEconomics, Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand.2
area planted to all other crops increased from





6.8 million tons to 9.6 million tons of paddy. (5, p. 46-47).
There has been considerable discussion over whether the expan-
of rice output has been due only to expansion of area harvested
or whether there has also been an increase in yield per hectare.
(7), (8, p. 56-71). The low quality of the data available prevents
a definitive answer. It appears that yield per hectare in the
mid-1960’s was roughly the same as during the period 1900-1930.




a low of 1.25 tons per hectare. They have since climbed
about 1.7 tons per hectare. Yields in tons per hectare vary
deal among regions, with 2.9 in the North; 1.0 in the North-
east; 1.7 in the Central Plains; and 1.3 in the South
These regions accounted for 7, 35, 49, and 9 percent,
of planted area in that year.
RICE EXPORTING AND THE RICE PREMIUM
in 1967/68.
respectively
The whole rice economy, and because of its dominance, therefore
the agricultural sector of Thailand, has been profoundly influenced
by events immediately following World War 11. The history of these
events and their econumic effects have been documented by Silcock,
so only a brief summary will be presented here. (8, appendix I).
Because of circumstances regarding Thailand’s status during
World War 11, Thailand was required to provide the United Nations3
with 1.5 million tons of milled rice at a price considerably below
world levels at that time. A
only legal exporter of rice.
prices of rice were kept very
allocation of rice ended, but
Rice Bureau was set up and made the
To avoid heavy treasury costs, domestic
low. By the end of 1949, the U.N.
the system was maintained because a
rise in domestic prices to world levels at that time would have
greatly reduced real incomes of urban consumers to politically
intole~able levels. (8, p. 217). The high world prices during the
Korean conflict enabled the government to obtain considerable money
by buying at the low domestic rice and exporting at world price.
However, a spurt in world production resulted in a buyer’s market for
rice from 1954 onwards and the Rice Bureau had difficulty in exporting,
and private traders were allowed to export but were required to pay a
premium for the privilege. The rate of ttmt premium was roughly set
at the difference between world market price and Thai domestic price.
At the beginning of 1955, the government turned all
back to the private sector. The “rice premium” was
mechanism for keeping domestic price at the desired
world price. It is therefore essentially an export




The level of the rice premium is set by the government as a fixed
amount per ton of milled rice loaded aboard ship, and the level varies
for different grades of rice. The exporter procures his rice in the
domestic market and makes his own sales negotiations abroad. When
the rice is loaded aboard ship and certified by customs inspectors,
the exporter then pays the premium to the government.L
The level of the premium is supposedly flexible to take into
account changes in world price levels. In practice, it rarely changes
more than once or twice per year, and in fact, remained constant from
bfay,1963 to January, 1967. (See Table 1). In addition, changes in
amount were very small during the period 1956-1966. In 1967 the pro-
cedure was changed from a specific rate to an ad valorem rate.
For example, white rice 100% is considered
Thai rice. At the peak in world rice prices in
sold for LK$250 per metric ton, F.O.B. Bangkok.
white rice 100’Zat that time was [[S$82per ton.
April 5, 1971, for the same grade, F.O.B. price
as the top quality
October, 1967, it
The rice premium on
During the week endinfi
was US$120 per ton,
and the premium was US$38 per ton. Numerous statistical studies have
shown that domestic wholesale prices usually are very nearly equal to
F,O.B. prices less the rice premium and exporting costs. (l). There
is an additional export tax on rice, a 5.7 percent ad valorem tax
which is collected on all agricultural exports.
The Thai Government also exports rice on a G-G basis. The
government negotiates the terms with the foreign government, and
then calls for bids from the private sector to provide the agreed upon
quantity and quality aboard ship. The difference between cost of
procurement to the government and what it sells the rice for is also
called “rice premium”, and is paid to the treasury. Since 1963, the
proportion of rice exported under G-G fluctuated from 25 to 50 per-
cent of total exports.5
The export markets for Thai rice have remained moderately stable
over the. Data from 1957 to 1969 are shown in Table 2. The share
going to Southeast Asia ranged from a high of 73 percent in 1961 to
a la of 47 percent in 1965 and 1968. West Asia’s share has grown
from none to 25 percent in 1968, The Middle East has also increased
it imports of Thai rice.
Over the years, the rice premium has been discussed, researched,
and debated more than any other economic topic in Thailand. The pro-
ponents claim 7 benefits to Thailand. They are:
1. }bjor source of government revenue.
2“ Only effective method of taxing agriculture.
3. Promotes agricultural diversification by making the
returns from other crops more attractive relative to
rice.
4. Naintains domestic food price stability.
5. Aids low income groups by keeping prices of rice low,
6. Promotes industrializationby keeping cost of living
and thereby labor costs low.
7. Provides bargaining power in exporting.
The opponents have refuted, sometimes empirically, all 7 arguments.
It would appear however that world market forces, and not the debate,
will cause the termination of the rice premium in the near future.
Present domestic prices for paddy are lower now than at any time since
1946, and farm prices of paddy are lower than the farmers can bear at6
the present time. ‘1’he premium has been abolished on glutinous rice,
but 1:.O.11. export prices still have fullcn to $61.20 per ton of wlki,tc
gultinous rice, 10[/. long grain. Farm prices for glutinous paddy are
reported to be as low as $25 per ton, and some is being used as
livestock feed. The comparable farm price for corn is $50 per metric
ton.
PRESENT POLICIES
Because of the dominance of rice in the Thai economy, nearly all
government policies either affect or are affected by rice. However,
only five policy areas will be discussed in this paper: technology,
irrigation, fertilizer, domestic processing and marketing, and
exporting.
Thailand has invested in rice research for a considerable period
of time. Rice is the only crop to have a separate department in the
)[inistry of ~\griculture. A breeding program was started in the early
1950’s. The principle technique was to collect large numbers of
selections from farmers’ fields, test”them under low fertility conditions
(resembling farmers’ conditions), and then release the best back into
the local area from which they came. Many local varieties of tradi-
tional types are present in Thailand. Thai people are very discriminating
in their taste for rice, and Thailand has long had a reputation in export
markets for high quality rice, so emphasis in the breeding was logically
on grain quality.7
Thailand strongly supported the formation and early programs of
lRR1 and has participated i.nnearly all of 11{1{1 act~vities. Thailand
however refused to permit the introduction and release of 11{-8in the
Kingdom, solely because of the quality. IR-8 was extensively tested
in Thailand, and although yields were high, it was felt that the cost
of damaging the export market quality reputation was greater than the
benefits of higher yield. However, a crossing program using IR-8 as
one parent was initiated, and two new varieties, RD-1 and RD-3, have
been released. These varieties appear to be roughly equal to IR-8 in
yielding ability, slightly better in disease resistance and local
adaptability, and although IR-8 is one parent, the grain quality is
high, following the other Thai parent.
About one million of the 6.4 million hectares of rice in the
Kingdom are produced in the Chao Phya Delta. A considerable portion
(perhaps one-third) of this area is subjected to deep flooding every
year, and floating rice is the only crop that can be grown. ThiS
presents serious problems in water control and rice breeding.
Irrigation has received heavy emphasis by the Thai Government
for a long time. Some of the structures in the Chao Phya Delta date
back to 1924. The biggest push started in 1950. The main policy has
been to construct large multi-purpose dams and reservoirs and the main
canals and laterals. The farmer has been responsible for constructing
farm ditches. In general, the farmer has not done so, and consequently
very little of the area under the command of major dams has good water8
control. This is mainly due to incomplete and poorly designed systems,
rather than lack of interest on the part of the farmer. Part of the
difficulty also lies in the multiple purposes for which the dams were
built. Electric power generation, navigation, and salt water extru-
sion seem to have the higher priorities than irrigation. In some
cases where there is water in the canal during the dry season, but not
enough to permit gravity irrigation, farmers have purchased small pumps
and pump the water from the canal onto the fields. In other cases,
farm cooperatives have purchased large pumps to pump out of the river.
Dry season cropping however probably still covers less than 10 percent
of the arable area in the delta. Although charges for water are per-
mitted by law, in practice none have ever been made in large projects.
The situation varies in other parts of the Kingdom. Very little
upland rice is grown; what is grown is chiefly in mountainous areas
by hill tribes under shifting cultivation. In the far north, where
farm size is small (1 hectare), the farmers have developed their own
year-round irrigation system. In the Northeast, dams are being built
on the larger rivers. Tanks are being built on smaller streams to
collect water in the wet season, chiefly for human consumption in the
dry season. Nowhere in the Kingdom is groundwater being utilized
through tubewells for irrigation, except in a few isolated spots.
There has recently been a major shift in government policy, away from
massive investment in large projects to investment in better utilization
of water from the projects already constructed.9
Whereas because of the rice premium the farmer receives consid-
erably less than world price for his rice, because of fertilizer policy
he pays considerably more than the world price for fertilizer, and
consequently doesn’t use very much. There is currently an embargo on
importation of ammonium sulfate and urea. The reason is that an
investment has been made in an obsolete lignite conversion based
fertilizer factory. Because the process is inefficient, cost of
production is from 1.5 to 2.0 times the cost in the most efficient
modern plant. When free imports were permitted, the plant could not
sell anything that it produced. Since finance was by a foreign
loan, the government is hesitant to write the plant off as a bad
investment. Although fertilizer imports increased exponentially
in the early 19601s, by 1969 growth in imports had stopped, and
fertilizer use may have actually declined. (11). One major inter-
national firm, which had already made a sizable investment in fer-
tilizer market development, closed its agro-chemicals division.
Although parts of the rice area, particularly where phosphorus is
deficient, use small amounts of fertilizer, the bulk is applied to
vegetable crops.
The government has generally followed a policy of letting all
processing and domestic marketing to the private sector. An attempt
was made to nationalize rice milling in 1949, but met too much
opposition to be implemented. The government for a time required
that permission be granted for the building of new rice mills,10
and attempted to allocate them to different areas on the basis of
production in local areas, but this requirement was finally dropped
in 1968. In 1950, rice milling was concentrated in Bangkok.
Decentralization has occurred until at the present time less than
5 percent of the rice is milled in Bangkok. The mills are generally
scattered throughout the country and fairly well allocated on the
basis of production. Most mills are of the abrasive stone type,
and steam engines burning husks for fuel are a common source of
power. A common milling arrangement is for the milling to be done
for the bran. The farmer brings the paddy and receives all of the
milled rice, with the miller keeping the bran, and sometimes the
smallest brokens, as milling fee. Thus, millers frequently also
have a pig feeding enterprise on the side. Most mills also have
equipment to separate the rice by grade. Japanese type rubber roller
mills have been tested but are not economic, because the cost of
rollers is greater than added value of whole rice.
Distribution channels are very well developed and technically
efficient. >Iostof the milled rice moves to Bangkok by river
barge at low cost. When milled rice is held for more than several
weeks before export, it is usually reconditioned and regraded. The
grading equipment permits blending grades to specification. Retail
shops commonly offer a wide range of grades to consumers,
The major export policy, the rice premium, has already been
described. .\system of multiple exchange rates was also in effect11
from 1946 to early 1955. The structure of the exporters is difficult
to determine. Most have been in business a long time, and most also
export other agricultural commodities. There are between 80 and 120
registered rice exporters, but it appears that most of these are
exporters in name only. Exports seem to be concentrated in 20 to 25
major firms, who frequently invite other smaller firms to join in
on a particular contract. This is apparently a device to make the
number of firms appear to be large, so that the large firms are not
charged with monopoly or oligapoly power. Most sales within the
region, to t~ongKong, Singapore, and Malaysia, in particular, are
based on personal or family contacts with orders placed by telegram
or long distance telephone calls.
One of the most striking features of the Thai rice trade is the
very fine and carefully controlled system of 38 grades. This system
of grades was developed by the private traders themselves, and
adherence to system is also maintained by the traders, not the
government. }Iosttraders belong to one of the national chambers
of commerce (Thai, Chinese, etc.), to the Thai JliceTrade Associa-
tion, and to the I\oardof Trade of Thailand, although membership
is not compulsory.
FLVLIREISS1’ES
There has been a great deal of discussion in Thailand during
April, 1971, about the rice problem. l]nfortunately, much of the12
discussion is based upon opinion and very little is based upon facts.
The purpose of this paper is to present some facts and the con-
clusions that can be drawn from them, and to point out areas in
which more facts are needed before the problems can be solved.
First, although rice is still a very important part of the
Thai economy, very little is known about the quantities produced,
marketed, consumed, and carried over from year to year. Export data,
except for that smuggled out of the country, are known; production
is roughly estimated by both an obsolete village headman reporting
system and a sample survey with an error too large to be tolerated;
and everything else, including stocks on hand, is “guesstimated”.
It is impossible for an exporting country to operate in today’s
hi~:hlycompetitive buyers’ rice market with such faulty information.
:\modern and accurate rice data program is long overdue. A statis-
tical crop reporting service, vested with the sole responsibility
and authority for all rice data should immediately be established in
the }Iinistryof /agriculture. Budl;etand personnel now engaged i.n
rice data collection of some type or other and spread c)utover at
least 7 different departments, divisions, sections or offices should
be transferred to the new service. Full access wherever needed to
the MO computor should be included. The technology and the expertise
are avaiablc, they simply need to be utilized in one central
program.
Second, tl~einternal conflict.between the policy of keeping
domestic prices low and tilepolicy of improving farm income must be13
resolved. .\ttllcpresent time clIrIarm floor support price pro}; ram
and the rice premium are in direct.conflict. ‘1’rying to push prices
down via the rice premium and pull them up via price supports is akin
to a man standing in a basket and trying to lift himself off of the
ground. With great exertion he can jump and actually raise the
basket off of the ground, but when he lands he is likely to break
both the basket and his feet.
The stated procedure of stabilizing domestic prices by mani-
pulation of the premium rate has not been followed. When F.O.B.
prices were S250 per ton (1007 grade 2) the premium was $82 per
ton. When F.O.R. prices fell to $120 per ton, the premium was
only reduced to S38 per ton. Its effectiveness as a bargaining
tool in exporting has not only been lost, but it in fact has hurt
exporting, because of frequent rumors and statements in the press,
and indecisiveness about changing the level of the premium. While
the premium does keep consumer prices low, it no longer is an
important source of government revenue, it no longer affects diver-
sification, and it is an oppreeive taxation of agriculture,
It has recently been suggested that the premium be abolished
for lower quality grades of rice but kept for the highest quality
grades, namely 100’Zand 5’7, white rice. Such a move would be self-
defeating for several reasons. ChIeis that Thailand’s export
reputation is built upon high quality grades. Thai white rice 100Z
is available nowhere else in the world but in Thailand. But retaining
the premium on 100% and abolishing it on lower grades would have the
effect of mal<ing100’)1 cheaper relative to lower grades in the domestic
market. Ibis would not only encourage increased domestic consump-
tion of 100 relative to lower grades, thereby discouraging export14
of this high foreign exchange earner, but it would also serve as
a disincentive to producers and millers for producing high quality
rice. Another reason is that Thailand faces its stiffest competi-
tion in exports in the low quality rice, not in 100% or 5<2. It is
the 25% and 35’7. and the parboiled that compete with lR-8 and others
being exported by other countries.
Given these facts and the current turmoil and uncertainty re-
garding Thai government manipulation of the rice premium, there is
only one solution. Abolish it totally and across the board.
The inunediate consequence would be an across the board rise
in domesitc prices by something less than the current amount of
the premium. What does this mean? The current F.O.11.price for
100% grade 2 is Baht 2,400 per ton, the premium is Baht 750 per
ton, and the Bangkok wholesale price is Raht 1,530 per ton (week
ending 5 April, 1971, as certified by the Rice Conunitteof the
Board of Trade of Thailand). in other words, wholesale price plus
premium is ];aht2,280 per ton, leaving Baht 120 to cover cost of
exporting, including other taxes, and profit. The wholesale price
would rise to something less than 13aht2,280 per ton (perhaps Baht
2,200). Assuming a marketing margin (spread between what Farmer
receives and wholesaler receives of 19%), (6, P. 248), this wwld
mean a farm level price of Baht 1,782 per ton of 1007 milled rice
or Baht 1,157 per ton of the equivalent amount of paddy (1.54 tons)
required to obtain 1 ton of milled rice (65X conversion rate).15
Although this is less than the desired price support of Baht 1,300
per ton for Special No. 1 paddy, it is close to the goal of Baht
1,150 per ton of Special No. 3 paddy. It is recognized that not
all paddy produced will yield 100L milled rice, but somewhere
between one-fourth and one-half would, depending upon weather
conditions during ripening and harvest, and incentive to millers,
‘X’he increased domestic price of milled rice would raise the cost
of living in Bangkok by 3 percent or less.
A rice price support program (floor prices to farmers) is tech-
nically, economically, and administratively unfeasible on several
counts. A farm price above domestic equilibrium price is not feasible
unless production controls are also put into effect. Limiting the
amount of rice each and every rice farmer in Thailand can produce
is not feasible. i\price support program requires storage space
for the rice purchased or, in some cases, the rice against which
loans or advances are made. Storage space of a volume sufficient
to make the scheme work is not available.
Price supports are not economically feasible for several
reasons. How much rice would have to be purchased by the govermnent
to raise price to all farmers? If 10 percent of the quantity pro-
duced, it would require 1.3 billion baht. The answer is probably
nearer 30 percent or 4 billion baht, or 20 percent of total govern-
ment expenditure in 1969. Such magnitudes might have unmanageable
repercussions on monetary and fiscal problems. If 80 percent of the
people are farmers, then can the remaining 20 percent be taxed16
(probably only 5 to 10 percent are taxable) to operate a rice price
support program?
The rice price support program is not administratively feasible
at the present time when it handles only 0.5 percent of production.
Already it is diverting scarce talent in the government from other
pressing problems, A program of the magnitude that could affect
farm income is totally unfeasible administratively.
In Qne sense, Thailand is fortunate to have had the rice
premium in the past, strictly in the sense that domestic equilibrium
prices are now below world equilibrium levels, even though world
prices are at low levels. This means that there are feasible govern-
ment policies that can affect farm income in the short run, namely
abolishing the rice premium and allowing farm prices rise to world
levels.
Third, is the management of exports in the short run. Totally
abolishing the premium will make exporting freer. There should be
no restrictions on exporters, with the objective of maximizing
foreign exchange earnings. This means exploiting all natural and
comparative advantages, and it also means C-C;sales where necessary,
and for credit if necessary. The possibilities of some barter with
countries such as India, Ceylon, Philippines, etc. should be ex-
plored for products now imported, such as steel, railway cars,
fertilizers, etc. There also should not be any government effort
to maintain a large number of exporters, ostensibly in the name of17
competition. In fact, a smaller number of large firms, each with
large volumes, should be encouraged. With a small number of large
firms, both the supervision to maintain grades and standards and
fulfillment of contracts would be easier, and the penalty for viola-
tion would be more severe. The goal should be no more than 10
exporting firms, each with a volume of at least 100,000 tons per
year.
Fourth, a very deep look must now be taken at Thailand’s rice
prospects over the next 5, 10, and 20 years. In doing so, the facts
are fewer and the informed best judgments and research backed
specualtions must be more. With respect
absolute and comparative advantages does
to the rest of the world? Vast areas of
to production, what natural,
Thailand have with respect
the central plains are
suited for nothing else but rice production. In some of these
areas, Thailand probably has an absolue cost advantage over the
rest of the world. In other parts of the Kingdom, there are vest
areas currently in rice production that might be better suited to
some other crop production if highly productive new varieties of
these crops were developed. One basic fact cannot be ignored.
Productivity throughout Thai agriculture is very, very low.
Thailand has not participated at all in the so-called “green re-
volution”. ‘l’here cannot be any long run increase in farmers’
income until productivity is raised. The past 20 years of gaining
increased production through exploitation of new land is at an end.18
The task is now to increase productivity on the land now under
cultivation. And this can come about only through well organized,
adequately financed, and problem oriented research programs focused
on the crops with the greatest potential. (lo). The consequences
of a failure to do so are severe. If Thailand doesn’t improve
productivity, it will not need to worry
in 10 years it will be a rice importer.
about exporting rice, for
(9).
Angther fact is currently being ignored in the public debate
on the rice problem. One must distinguish between two different
causes of reduced exports, namely between demand constraints and
supply constraints. F.O.B. export prices in October, 1967, were
the highest in Thai history. Yet exports in 1967, 68 and 69 were
1.48, 1.03, and 1.o2 million tons, respectively. Exports for 1964,
65 and 66 were 1.9, 1.9, and 1.5. million tons, respectively. Bad
weather, excessive carryover stocks, smuggling, and other causes
have all been blamed. But the real reason is probably that popula-
tion is increasin~ faster each year than is production. The conclusion
is that Thai rice faced a supply constraint hefore it faced a demand
constraint. ‘Ihecurrent emphasis on policy measures to combat a
demand constraint are diverting attention from the supply constraint.
Resolving the supply constraint involves a number of policies
that have been discussed elsewhere. Hriefly they include water
control, researc[lon new varieties, and a rational fertilizer
policy. (11).19
The question is, should Thailand increase rice production?
It has no choice, unless it wants to become a rice importer. The
real question is strategy. All production must come form a land
area of probably no more than one-half of the current area planted
to rice. Which means something on the order of doubled yields on
the land best suited to rice or without an alternative use than rice.
Diversification as presently being expounded is an empty phrase.
Land cannot and will not be diverted from rice to other crops unless
rice yields or other crop yields or both increase substantially.
Slogans don’t diversify production, but good research and rapid
adoption of its results could.
There are other questions involved as to what long-run level
of rice production should be sought. One question is whether the
current world situation is the result of a permanent increase in the
trend of world rice production, or whether it is just a temporary
shift in the level of the old trend. Will production continue to
increase faster than population, or will the countries now climbing
towards self-sufficiency be massive importers again in 5 or 10 years?
What will be the nature of tl~eThai domestic demand in 10 or
20 years’2 ‘1’l]e number of Thai people will double in the next 17
years, and if tl~epresent level of consumption remains at 155 kg. per
capita, massive increases in production will be necessary for Thailand
to remain self sufficient. The alternative is a large shift in tastes
and preferences from rice to wheat. Income elasticity of demand for
rice in Thailand is still positive, although low, and wheat cannot be
produced in commercial quantities, so a shift to wheat doesn’t seem
likely. Tlmiland has got to be a major rice producer for a long time.Table 1. Premium Rate on White Rice 100% Exported from Thailand,
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